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THE GUILDS, CORPORATE SOCIETY
AND SELF-GOVERNMENT IN
INTRA-STATE INDUSTRY*
THOMAS P. WHELAN
T HAT man is a social and political animal may be a trite dictum
of Aristotle: it is also irresistibly true and actual. Man has need
of his fellow men. He does not wish to live apart or isolated from
them. He craves social intercourse. He leads a natural normal life in
the family-the basic unit in a larger and more perfect society. Man
realizes that in the mutual assistance of family life alone can he
develop human life in any fullness. Man's social consciousness becomes
acutely aware of the power, impulse and need he has for the institu-
tion of a natural and juridical social unit second to the family and
developing life's full faculties, physical, mental and moral. Thus there
springs into being, determined by the natural purposes and exigencies
of men that civil society which we have come to call the state-a
community of freemen working together for the common happiness
of life under a government which is administered for the benefit of
all making for peace and prosperity, promoting the general welfare.'
There have, however, developed within the state in a natural way
numerous societies. Man it seems cannot escape the natural urge to
form numerous associations and societies and thus reach a very high
state of development in social life. Such associations and societies he
has also used to ameliorate his economic condition. Those societies
are natural because they respond to a necessary and natural urge in
man. They are not perfect societies for they are dependent on a larger
society-the state, to which they have a distinct juridical and moral
relationship.2 Man can achieve what are termed the proximate ends
of the state, peace and prosperity without such societies or associa-
tions. They, however, advance the proximate ends of the state, make
for public order, promote the general welfare and respond to that
multiplicity and diversity of desires innate in man which the larger
unit cannot effectively promote. They are rooted in man's social
nature. They do not originate in or spring from the state. They may
be at odds with certain forms of the state. They do presuppose the
autonomous self-governing person whose natural rights are prior to
the state and its basic law.
*This paper was read at the National Catholic Conference on Social Action in
Milwaukee in May, 1938.See MACKSEY, THE FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY.
2See BILLOT, DE EccLEslA CHRnsni.
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We note in the Encyclical Quadrigesimo Anno the following signifi-
cant statement: "The aim of social legislation must therefore be the
reestablishment of vocational groups. For as nature induces those who
dwell in close proximity to unite in municipalities, so those who prac-
tice the same trade or profession economic or otherwise combine into
vocational groups. These groups in a true sense autonomous are con-
sidered by many to be, if not essential to civil society, at least its
natural and spontaneous developments." Such vocational groups ful-
fill that "unity in well arranged multiplicity" which St. Thomas re-
garded as the essence of true order. Thus true political order is dis-
tinguished from that dull static uniformity which we associate with
the servile society of the Communists and Socialists.
Any discussion of such vocational groups, associations and societies
naturally bring us to a brief consideration of the guilds, which were
a determining factor in the social and economic order of medieval
society. Said Hilaire Belloc in that very original and almost prophetic
monograph The Servile State: "Meanwhile side by side with this
emancipation of mankind in the direct line of descent from the old
chattel slaves of the Roman villa went in the middle ages a crowd of
institutions which all similarly made for a distribution of property.
Thus industry of every kind in the town, in transport, in crafts, and
in commerce was organized in the form of guilds. And a guild was
a society partly cooperative but in the main composed of private own-
ers of capital whose corporation was self-governing and was designed
to check competition between its members and to prevent the growth of
one at the expense of the other. Above all most jealously did the
guilds safeguard the division of property so that there should be
formed within its ranks no proletariat upon the one side and no
monopolizing capitalist upon the other."3
Said the same author in a current comment, with respect to the
individualistic and unmoral society of our day in which neither the
guilds nor the spiritual order upon which they reposed function: "All
men of my generation remember the times when pretty well all eco-
nomic activity though motivated by individual gain, was checked and
made useful by active competition. Under unrestrained competition,
however, the ownership of means of production, transport, distribu-
tion, information and especially credit in the hands of a few, increas-
ingly tends toward monopoly."
We must not, however, idealize the medieval guilds or imagine
that they covered the whole period and the whole economic life of
medieval society. We know that in those centers where cloth was
manufactured particularly for foreign export, and production was in-
i BELLoc. THE SERvnE STATE 48.
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tended not so much for the limited patrons of the town and its environs
but for international commerce, that there were two distinct classes in
the economic order-a capitalist class and a proletariat class. We do
know that in the middle of the fourteenth century the city of Ghent
had over 4,000 weavers and 1,200 fullers. The manufacture of cloth
dominated the economic life of Ghent. The total population of Ghent
was around 50,000.4 There were crises and stoppages. We had all the
incidents of the capitalist society of our day, insecurity, instability and
even strikes. However, the conditions that obtained in Ghent and in
other cities engaged in the manufacture of products for international
commerce were not the characterizing and determining conditions of
economic life in the Middle Ages. Men owned property in significant
amounts.
We must, furthermore, bear in mind that the industrial and eco-
nomic conditions and the social order of our modern world are totally
distinct from that which obtained in the age of the guilds. Modern
fuel, electric power, costly labor saving machinery were not even dis-
covered. The corporation, the joint stock company, the factory, the
bank as we know such today were not known. The state was not the
powerful absolute thing that it endeavours to be today. There were
not then the manifold departments of state, the bureaucracies, the com-
missions, the investigators, the intelligence system-those myriad eyes
of the modem state. Does it not, therefore, seem a mere utopian dream
to urge the development of corporate and vocational groups in a
society that is diametrically opposed to the metaphysics, the economics,
the finance, and conditions of labor, the moral and spiritual order of
those ages when such corporate and vocational groups flourished under
the name of the guilds? Is it not idle to discuss fair trade practices,
a living wage and the just price in a society the determining number
of whose members deny the very foundations of the moral order on
which such realities were based?
Men, however, have come to realize during the past decade that
all is not well with the economic and social order even in this prom-
ised land of ours whose proud boast, and justly so, has been equal
opportunity for all. Men have more and more through those years of
economic stress and recurrent depressions come to realize that con-
tract has taken an abnormal preeminence over status. We have seen
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of East Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish5 affirm the power of states to establish, upon
bases of health and morals, minimum wages for women and children.
This case it seems to me is a distinct departure from those legal views
4PIRRENE, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL EUROPE 189.
1300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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with respect to absolute freedom of contract and the consequent nega-
tion of status so clearly and vigorously expressed by Justice Souther-
land in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.0 Furthermore, men have come
to realize that the taking of the increment from a non-productive loan
or usury is an evil immoral thing-that unlimited competition makes
for monopoly; that there is a concentration of credit which makes for
arbitrary discrimination and which has been described in the Social
Encyclical as a veritable stranglehold.
Congress and the legislatures of different states have endeavoured
by legislative enactments to remedy such crying evils in the social
order. We cannot quarrel with the economic and social values of the
objectives sought by those acts. It is a familiar fact that to stabilize
industry, to regulate wages and hours, to regulate prices, to prevent
unfair competition and unfair methods of competition were the major
objectives of the National Industrial Recovery Act.7
An examination of the Wisconsin Statutes shows that in 1921 there
was enacted what is now Section 100.20 prohibiting in general terms
''unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices." The old
idea associated with the philosophers and economists of the Man-
chester School that the only function of the state was the protection
of life and property is long since dead. In fact economic individualism
has brought about state regulation of business and industry on a scale
hitherto unknown. Too often, however, the state has become a kind of
unwelcome law enforcement officer following in a routine perfunc-
tory manner the rules and mandates detailed and set out in some
impersonal manual. Regulation by the state after the manner of the
police manual has been neither welcome nor effective. It must also be
said that the endeavour of the law to protect free and unrestrained
competition as to the state and federal anti-trust acts has not been suc-
cessful. May we then seek a solution to the problem of regulating
unfair competition and unfair trade practices by means of codes which
originate within the various industries, vocations and professions?
What has been done in the state of Wisconsin for instance with respect
to such regulation of trade practices by means of codes? What is the
legal status of such codes? What should be the relationship and atti-
tude of the state but particularly the legal relationship of the state
to industrial self-government diversified according to industries, serv-
ices, professions, vocations, associations, societies? What can such
industrial self-government effect with respect to predatory competi-
tion? The following paragraph from The Crisis of Civilization by
Hilaire Belloc is a fair summary of what the guild partially effected
6261 U.S. 525 (1923).
748 STAT. 195 (1933).
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in other days: "The craftsman of the town guild could not form a
monopoly; he could not undertake more than a certain amount of
work to the detriment of his fellow craftsman. The same was true of
the shopkeeper, whose activities were regulated, or at least limited,
by the Company or Guild of which he formed a member. The number
of apprentices he might take was subject to license; and the prices he
might charge lay between certain known limits. He might not forestall.
He might not speculate. Still less might he temporarily sell at a loss
and so ruin a competitor artificially.""
The Wisconsin law enacted in 1921 was evidently intended to be
limited to dealings in food products particularly agricultural. It will
be remembered that in 1932, there was a price war among the distribu-
tors of fluid milk in Milwaukee. The result of the price cutting was
that farmers, already almost bankrupt by the depression, were particu-
larly hard hit. The Department of Agriculture and Markets acting
under the 1921 statute, Section 100.20, fixed minimum prices of sale
with respect to consumers and minimum prices of purchase from pro-
ducers of fluid milk in the Milwaukee market. The authority and power
of the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture and Markets was never
tested in the supreme court of the state. One must remember that the
statute was a general statute and sought to prohibit in general terms
"unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices." How-
ever, in 1933 the legislature enacted specific legislation conferring
specific power with respect to this matter on the Department of
Agriculture and Markets. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v.
Lincoln Dairy Co.,9 sustained this legislation on the authority of the
now historic case, Nebbia v. New York,'10 in which a similar enactment
of the state of New York was sustained by the United States Supreme
Court. The reasoning of the Supreme Court with respect to sustaining
the New York legislation ran as follows:
"The private character of a business does not necessarily exempt it
from the regulation of prices by the state.
"There is no closed class or category of business affected with a
public interest, and the function of the courts under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether under
the circumstances the regulation is a reasonable exertion of govern-
mental authority, or is arbitrary or discriminatory.
"The phrase 'affected with a public interest,' as used in decisions
upholding public regulation of businesses affected with a public inter-
est, means only that an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to
control for the public good.
"So far as the due process requirement is concerned, a state is free to
adopt and enforce whatever economic policy may reasonably be
8 BELLoc, THE CRISIS OF CIVILIZATION 150.
9221 Wis. 1, 265 N.W. 197 (1936).
10 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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deemed to promote public welfare, whether by promoting free compe-
tition by laws aimed at monopolies, or by curbing harmful competition
by fixing minimum prices.
"Where a law is not arbitrary or discriminatory, the courts cannot
deal with the wisdom of the legislative policy or with the adequacy or
practicability of the law enacted to forward it.
"The Constitution does not secure the liberty to conduct a business
so as to injure the public at large or any substantial group.
"Price control is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory,
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt,
and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference with indi-
vidual liberty.1"
The state of Wisconsin in 1933 enacted Chapter 110 of the Wis-
consin Statutes. This was in a sense the state counterpart of the fed-
eral act now familiarly known as the NIRA. This chapter of the Wis-
consin Statutes came to be known familiarly as the WRA. It had for
its objectives the relief of unemployment, the stabilization of industry,
the regulation of wages and hours, as also the regulation of prices.
This act was declared unconstitutional in the case of Gibson Auto Co.,
Inc. v. Finnegan.2 The theory on which the decision rests is that the
statute authorized individuals in industry to determine whether there
should be codes of fair competition and to adopt such codes which,
when approved by the governor, should become law with penal sanc-
tions. This was clearly an unlawful attempt to delegate the law-making
power vested in the senate and assembly by Section I, Article 4 of the
state constitution. It resolved itself into this, an endeavor to delegate
the power of the legislature to determine whether or not there shall
be a code, or, in other words, a law, to a preponderant majority of
some unascertained group of a private and non-legislative nature. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court had previously in the case of State v. Whit-
man,'s charted the limitations to be observed in making a valid dele-
gation of legislative power in the following language: "The power to
declare whether or not there shall be a law; to determine the general
purpose or policy to be achieved by the law; to fix the limits within
which the law shall operate,--is a power which is vested by our con-
stitution in the legislature and may not be delegated. When, however,
the legislature has laid down these fundamentals of a law, it may dele-
gate to administrative agencies the authority to exercise such legisla-
tive power as is necessary to carry into effect the general legislative
purpose."14
The Wisconsin Legislature in 1935 revised Chapter 110. In Sep-
tember, 1935, upon petition of the state on relation of the Attorney
11 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 et seq. (headnotes) (1934).12217 Wis. 401, 259 N.W. 420 (1935).
Is 196 Wis. 472, 220 N.W. 929 (1928).
14 State v. Whitman, supra note 13 at 505.
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General and others, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin granted leave for
an original action in that court for a declaratory judgment as to the
constitutionality of Chapter 110 of the Laws of 1935.5 The court
sustained the statute as constitutional. The statute is distinctly an
emergency statute and provides for its own determination. Now an
emergency may enlarge the field over which the legislature may exert
the police power. An emergency, however, does not affect the delega-
bility of legislative power. The statute has a definite legislative stand-
ard. It vests the governor with power to investigate, ascertain, declare,
and prescribe reasonable codes of fair competition and trade prac-
tices for the various trades and industries in the state. [Section 110.04
(1) (a) ] This is not unconstitutional as an unlawful delegation of legis-
lative power. The Act restricts the governor's power to the elimination
of unfair methods of competition or unfair trade practices and thereby
subscribes a sufficient standard. On this standard the governor must
proceed and any regulation made with reference to certain specified
subjects mentioned in the act, as for instance the establishment of
maximum hours of labor, must bear a reasonable relation to the elimi-
nation of unfair methods of competition or unfair trade practices.
Thus with respect to such a subject, or point, will it conform to the
standard prescribed by the act.
Evidently much had been learned in the two years previous to the
passing of this act with respect to the failure of the legislature to enact
a sufficiently definite legislative standard, one of the two defects found
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the National Recovery
Act. This was the defect on which Justice Cardozo put such vigorous
and explicit emphasis in the famous case of Schechter Poultry Corp.
v United States :'1
"If codes of fair competition are codes eliminating unfair methods
of competition ascertained upon inquiry to prevail in one industry or
another, there is no unlawful delegation of legislative functions when
the President is directed to inquire into such practices and denounce
them when discovered * * *
"But there is another conception of codes of fair competition, their
significance and function, which leads to very different consequences,
though it is one that is struggling now for recognition and acceptance.
By this other conception a code is not to be restricted to the elimina-
tion of business practices that would be characterized by general
acceptance as oppressive or unfair. It is to include whatever ordinances
may be desirable or helpful for the well-being or prosperity of the
industry affected. In that view, the function of its adoption is not
merely negative, but positive; the planning of improvements as well
as the extirpation of abuses. What is fair, as thus conceived, is not
25 In re Petition of State ex rel. Attorney General, 220 Wis. 25, 264 N.W. 633
(1936).16295 U.S. 495, 552, 553 (1935).
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something to be contrasted with what is unfair or fraudulent or tricky.
The extension becomes as wide as the field of industrial regulation.
If that conception shall prevail, anything that Congress may do within
the limits of the commerce clause for the betterment of business may
be done by the President upon the recommendation of a trade associa-
tion by calling it a code. This is delegation running riot. No such pleni-
tude of power is susceptible of transfer."
The Wisconsin Act is then distinctly an emergency statuteYy It
has a definite legislative standard-elimination of unfair methods of
business competition and unfair trade practices. All administrative
orders under the statute must bear a reasonable relationship to this
legislative standard of the law. An aggrieved member of an industry
or service group had the right to petition the authority charged with
the administration of the act, then the Trade Practice Commission,
for a hearing and to have findings and a determination made upon
such petition.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin dealt with this latter point in the
case of State ex rel. Attorney General v. Fasekas.1a An analysis of this
case shows that a member or members of an industry who are dis-
satisfied with the provisions of a code or who feel that their rights
are thereby unwarrantably invaded, must proceed in the manner pro-
vided by the statute. The statutory method and scope of review is
exclusive. An order establishing a code under the statute must be
made pursuant to certain findings of fact. The case further shows that
the governor under the statute is not authorized to fix wages generally
but only in those cases where it can be established as a matter of fact
that the fixing of wages has a relation to the elimination of unfair
trade practices and unfair methods of competition. This finding can not
rest upon mere assertion; it must rest upon proof. The case distinctly
held that the Act conferred no power to fix wages and prices unless
the relation of such wages and prices to the eliminaiton of unfair
trade practices and unfair methods of competition can be established
as a matter of fact.
In 1936 seven codes, those for the barber, bowling, cleaning and
dyeing, mason, concrete and carpenter construction, painting, paper-
hanging and decorating, shoe rebuilding, window cleaning, were re-
vised into Trade Practice Standards. In 1936 there were in all eleven
codes in effect. The administrative machinery was also reorganized.
There was a Trade Practice Commission of two members; there was a
Trade Practice Review Board with nine members. The administration
of each code was placed in the hands of the Trade Practice Com-
'TWis. STAT. (1935) c. 110.18 223 Wis 356, 269 N.W. 700 (1936).
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mission. The Trade Practice Review Board had power to hear and
decide appeals from acts of the Trade Practice Commission.
It is now familiar history that in the general session of the legisla-
ture of 1937, the codes were permitted to die a legal death. They were,
however, revived in a special session of the fall of that year.10 During
the intermission, however, many of the codes were not observed and
the fine, constructive work accomplished in the two preceding years
was all but nullified. We cannot, therefore, draw any conclusive infer-
ences from the working and administration of the codes in Wisconsin
with respect to their effectiveness as regards the economic evils that
beset our industrial society. We can reasonably say that they worked
well in the services in cleaning and dyeing and in the barber trade. They
did put a stop to predatory price cutting. They did in certain centers
help towards maximum hours and a minimum wage. However, it
must be borne in mind that they were in operation during a period
when there was much union activity and a general rise in wages in
many parts of the state. We know, however, that there were certain
industries in which the codes did not work effectively, in the concrete
and carpenter construction, painting and decorating. It may, neverthe-
less be reasonably said that they constituted a constructive effort with a
high economic and social purpose. They were ineffective with respect
to any attack on monopoly as it now stands entrenched. It has been
clearly established that they were constitutional and that they afforded
an opportunity for indirectly regulating wages and hours in those in-
dustries that were purely intra-state. They turned the attention of
economists, employers, and employees towards a new conception of
the autonomous regulation of industry with a minimum of interference
and supervision by the state. They did help and certainly pointed the
way toward the abatement of class warfare. They brought the owners
and managers of industry and the employees into contact in at least
a limited way. They established a more human relationship and pointed
a way to amity and peace under a plan which treated work not as a
mere commodity to be sold at exchange, a plan that further made for
the acceptance of human values, the safeguarding of industrial free-
dom, limited competition, and precluded economic determinism as well
as its inevitable concomitant collective servitude.
19 Wis. Laws, Spec. Sess. 1937, c. 3.
